The forcing method is a powerful tool to prove the consistency of set-theoretic assertions relative to the consistency of the axioms of set theory. Laver's theorem and Bukovský's theorem assert that set-generic extensions of a given ground model constitute a quite reasonable and sufficiently general class of standard models of set-theory.
The category of forcing extensions as the set-theoretic multiverse
The forcing method is a powerful tool to prove the consistency of set-theoretic (i.e., mathematical) assertions relative to (the consistency of) the axioms of set theory. If a sentence σ in the language L ZF of set theory is proved to be relatively consistent with the axioms of set theory (ZFC) by some forcing argument then it is so in the sense of the strictly finitist standpoint of Hilbert: the forcing proof can be recast into an algorithm A such that, if a formal proof P of a contradiction from ZFC + σ is ever given, then we can transform P with the help of A to another proof of a contradiction from ZFC or even ZF alone.
The "working set-theorists" however prefer to see their forcing arguments not as mere discussions concerning manipulations of formulas in a formal system but rather concerning the "real" mathematical universe in which they "live". Forcing for them is thus a method of extending the universe of set theory where they originally "live" (the ground model, usually denoted as "V ") to many (actually more than class many in the sense of V ) different models of set theory called generic extensions of V . Actually, a family of generic extensions is constructed for certain V -definable partial orderings P. Each such generic extension is obtained first by fixing a so-called generic filter G which is a filter over P, sitting outside V with a "generic" sort of transcendence over V , and then by adding G to V to generate a new structure -the generic extension V [G] of V -which is also a model of ZFC. Often this process of taking generic extensions over some model of set theory is even repeated transfinitely-many times. As a result, a set-theorist performing forcing constructions is seen to live in many different models of set theory simultaneously. This is manifested in many technical expositions of forcing where the reader very often finds narratives beginning with phrases like: "Working in V [G], . . . ", "Let α < κ be such that x is in the α th intermediate model V [G α ] and . . . ", "Now returning to V , . . . ", etc., etc.
Although this "multiverse" view of forcing is in a sense merely a modus loquendi, it is worthwhile to study the possible pictures of this multiverse per se. Some initial moves in this direction have been taken e.g. in [1] , [2] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [11] , [12] , [21] , [24] etc. The term "multiverse" probably originated in work of Woodin in which he considered the "set-generic multiverse", the "class" of set-theoretic universes which forms the closure of the given initial universe V under set-generic extension and set-generic ground models. Sometimes we also have to consider the constellations of the set-generic multiverse where V cannot be reconstructed as a set-generic extension of some of or even any of the proper inner models of V . To deal with such cases it is more convenient to consider the expanded generic multiverse where we also assume that the multiverse is also closed under the construction of definable inner models.
The set-generic universe should be distinguished from the "class-generic multiverse", defined in the same way but with respect to class-forcing extensions and ground models, as well as inner models of class-generic extensions that are not themselves class-generic (see [5] ). It is even possible to go beyond classforcing by considering forcings whose conditions are classes, so-called hyperclass forcings (see [6] ). The broadest point of view with regard to the multiverse is expressed in [7] , where the "hyperuniverse" is taken to consist of all universes which share the same ordinals as the initial universe (which is taken to be countable to facilitate the construction of new universes). The hyperuniverse is closed under all notions of forcing.
In this article we restrict our attention to the set-generic multiverse. The well-posedness of questions regarding the set-generic multiverse is established by the theorems of Laver and Bukovský which we discuss in Section 2. These theorems show that the set-generic extensions and set-generic ground models of a given universe represent a "class" of models with a natural characterization.
The straightforward formulation of the set-generic multiverse requires the notion of "class" of classes which cannot be treated in the usual framework of ZF set theory, but, as emphasized at the beginning, theorems about the setgeneric multiverse are actually meta-theorems about ZFC. However we can also consider a theory which is a conservative extension of ZFC in which set-generic extensions and set-generic ground models are real objects in the theory and the set-generic multiverse a definable class. In Section 4, we consider such a system and show that it is a conservative extension of ZFC.
The multiverse view sometimes highlights problems which would never have been asked in the conventional context of forcing constructions (see [11] ). As one such example we consider in Section 5 the problem of the existence of infinitely many independent buttons (in the sense of [12] ).
Laver's theorem and Bukovský's theorem
In the forcing language, we often have to express that a certain set is already in the ground model, e.g. in a statement like: p -P " . . .ẋ is in V and . . . ". In such situations we can always find a large enough ordinal ξ such that the set in question should be found in that level of the cumulative hierarchy in the ground model. So we can reformulate a statement like the one above into something like p -P " . . .ẋ ∈V ξ and . . . " which is a legitimate expression in the forcing language.
This might be one of the reasons why it is proved only quite recently that the ground model is always definable in an arbitrary set-generic extension:
Theorem 2.1 (R. Laver, [17] , H. Woodin [23] ). There is a formula ϕ * (x, y) in L ZF such that, for any transitive model V of ZFC and set-generic extension
An important corollary of Laver's theorem is that a countable transitive model of ZFC can have at most countably many ground models for set forcing.
Bukovský's theorem gives a natural characterization of inner models M of V such that V is a set-generic extension of M (1) . Note that, by Laver's theorem Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that P consists of the positive elements of a κ-c.c. atomless complete Boolean algebra. Note that P adds new subset of On since P adds a new set (e.g. the (V, P)-generic set). Suppose thatṠ is a P-name of a new subset of On. Let θ be a sufficiently large regular cardinal and let M ≺ H(θ) be such that
LetṪ be a P-name such that -P "Ṫ =Ṡ ∩ M ". By (2.1), it is enough to show the following, where V denotes the ground model:
(1) In the terminology of [8] , M is a ground of V .
Claim 2.2.1.
⊢ Otherwise there would be p ∈ P and T ∈ V , T ⊆ On such that
We show in the following that then we can construct a strictly decreasing sequence q α : α < κ in P ∩ M such that (2.5) p ≤ P q α for all α < κ.
But since {q α · −q α+1 : α < κ} is then a pairwise disjoint subset of P, this contradicts the κ-c.c. of P.
Suppose that q α : α < δ for some δ < κ has been constructed. If δ is a limit, let q δ = α<δ q α . Then we have p ≤ P q δ and q δ ≤ P q α for all α < δ. Since q α : α < δ ∈ M by (2.2), we also have q δ ∈ M.
If δ = β + 1, then, since M |="q β does not decideṠ" by the elementarity of M, there are ξ ∈ On ∩ M and q, q ′ ∈ P ∩ M with q, q ′ ≤ P q β such that q -P " ξ ∈Ṡ " and q ′ -P " ξ ∈Ṡ ". At least one of them, say q, must be incompatible with p. Then q δ = q β · −q is as desired.
Note that, translated into the language of complete Boolean algebras, the lemma above just asserts that no κ-c.c. atomless Boolean algebra B is (2 <κ , 2)-distributive. Suppose now that we work in NBG, V is a transitive model of ZFC and M an inner model of ZFC in V (that is M is a transitive class ⊆ V with (M, ∈) |= ZFC). For a regular uncountable cardinal κ in M, we say that M κ-globally covers V if for every function f (in V ) with dom(f ) ∈ M and rng(f ) ⊆ M, there is a function g ∈ M with dom(g) = dom(f ) such that As the referee of the paper points out, this theorem can be formulated more naturally in the von Neumann-Bernays-Gödel class theory (NBG) since in the (2) Tadatoshi Miyamoto told us that James Baumgartner independently proved this theorem in an unpublished note using infinitary logic. framework of ZFC this theorem can only be formulated as a meta-theorem, that is, as a collection of theorems consisting corresponding statements for each formula which might define an inner model M.
Proof of Theorem 2.3: If V is a κ-c.c. set-generic extension of M, say by a partial ordering P ∈ M with M |="P has the κ-c.c.", then it is clear that M κ-globally covers V (for f as above, letḟ ∈ M be a P-name of f and g be defined by letting g(α) to be the set of all possible valuesḟ (α) may take).
The proof of the converse is done via the following Lemma 2.4. Note that, by Grigorieff's theorem (see Corollary 2.6 below), the statement of this Lemma is a consequence of Bukovský's theorem:
Note that it can happen easily that
We first show that Theorem 2.3 follows from Lemma 2.4. Assume that M κ-globally covers V . We have to show that V is a κ-c.c. set-generic extension of M. In V , let λ be a regular cardinal such that λ <κ = λ and A ⊆ On be a set such that 
.But this is a contradiction to (2.6).
(Theorem 2.3)
Proof of Lemma 2.4: We work in M and construct a κ-c.c. partial ordering P such that M[A] is a P-generic extension over M.
is a model of ZF: this can be seen easily e.g. by applying Theorem 13.9 in [13] . If M also satisfies AC then M [A] satisfies AC as well since, in this case, it is easy to see that a well-ordering of (
Let µ ∈ On be such that A ⊆ µ and let L ∞ (µ) be the infinitary sentential logic with atomic sentences (2.7) "α ∈Ȧ" for α ∈ µ and the class of sentences closed under ¬ and where ¬ is to be applied to a formula and to an arbitrary set of formulas. To be specific let us assume that the atomic sentences "α ∈Ȧ" for α ∈ µ are coded by the sets α, 0 for α ∈ µ, the negation ¬ϕ by ϕ, 1 and the infinitary disjunction Φ by Φ, 2 . We regard the usual disjunction ∨ of two formulas as a special case of and other logical connectives like " ", "∧", "→" as being introduced as abbreviations of usual combinations of ¬ and . For a sentence ϕ ∈ L ∞ (µ) and B ⊆ µ, we write B |= ϕ when ϕ holds if each atomic sentence of the form "α ∈Ȧ" in ϕ is interpreted by "α ∈ B" and logical connectives in ϕ are interpreted in canonical way. For a set Γ of sentences, we write
Let ⊢ be a notion of provability for L ∞ (µ) in some logical system which is correct (i.e. Γ ⊢ ϕ always implies Γ |= ϕ) (4) , upward absolute (i.e. M ⊆ N and M |= "Γ ⊢ ϕ" always imply N |= "Γ ⊢ ϕ" for any transitive models M, N of ZF) and sufficiently strong (so that all the arguments used below work for this ⊢). In Section 3 we introduce one such deductive system (as well as an alternative approach without using such a deduction system, based on Lévy Absoluteness).
Note that M[A] |= "A |= T ". It follows that T is consistent with respect to our deduction system (in V ). In M, let
and for ϕ, ψ ∈ P, let (4) More precisely, we assume that ZFC proves the correctness of ⊢.
In particular, "α ∈Ȧ" ∈ P for all α ∈ A and "¬(α ∈Ȧ)" ∈ P for all α ∈ µ \ A.
⊢ Suppose A |= ϕ. We have to show T ⊢ ¬ϕ: If T ⊢ ¬ϕ in M, then we would have V |= "T ⊢ ¬ϕ". Since A |= T in V , it follows that A |= ¬ϕ. This is a contradiction.
Claim 2.4.2. For ϕ, ψ ∈ P, ϕ and ψ are compatible if and only if
Note that (2.11) is equivalent to
⊢ Suppose that ϕ, ψ ∈ P are compatible. By the definition of ≤ P this means that there is η ∈ P such that T ⊢ η → ϕ and T ⊢ η → ψ. For this η we have T ⊢ η → (ϕ ∧ ψ). Since T ⊢ ¬η by the consistency of T , it follows that ⊢ Suppose that Γ ⊆ P is an antichain. Since | g(Γ) | < κ, it is enough to show that g(Γ) = Γ. Suppose otherwise and let ϕ 0 ∈ Γ \ g(Γ). Since " Γ → g(Γ)" ∈ T and ⊢ ϕ 0 → Γ, we have
It follows that there is ϕ ∈ g(Γ) such that ϕ 0 and ϕ are compatible. This is because otherwise we would have T ⊢ ϕ 0 → ¬ϕ for all ϕ ∈ g(Γ) by Claim 2.4.2.
. From this and (2.13), it follows that T ⊢ ¬ϕ 0 . But this is a contradiction to the assumption that ϕ 0 ∈ P. Now, since Γ is pairwise incompatible, it follows that ϕ 0 = ϕ ∈ g(Γ). This is a contradiction to the choice of ϕ 0 .
⊣ (Claim 2.4.3)
In V , let G(A) = {ϕ ∈ P : A |= ϕ}. By Claim 2.4.1, we have G(A) = {ϕ ∈ L λ (µ) : A |= ϕ} and A is definable from G(A) over M as {α ∈ µ : "α ∈Ȧ" ∈
Hence the following two Claims prove our Lemma:
⊢ Suppose that ϕ ∈ G(A) and ϕ ≤ P ψ. Since this means that A |= ϕ and T ⊢ ϕ → ψ, it follows that A |= ψ. That is, ψ ∈ G(A). Suppose now that ϕ, ψ ∈ G(A). This means that (2.14) A |= ϕ and A |= ψ.
Hence we have A |= ϕ ∧ ψ. By Claim 2.4.1, it follows that (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ P, that is, ⊢ Working in M, suppose that Γ is a maximal antichain in P. By Claim 2.4.3,
we have | Γ | < κ and hence we have Γ ∈ L λ (µ) and hence Γ ∈ P: For ϕ ∈ Γ, since ϕ ∈ P we have T ⊢ ¬ϕ and ⊢ ϕ → Γ. It follows T ⊢ Γ.
Moreover we have T ⊢ Γ: Otherwise ¬ Γ would be an element of P incompatible with every ϕ ∈ Γ. A contradiction to the maximality of Γ.
Hence A |= Γ and thus there is ϕ ∈ Γ such that A |= ϕ. That is, ϕ ∈ G(A). 
. By (2.15), it follows that T ⊢ ϕ 0 → ¬ D. On the other hand, since ϕ 0 ∈ D we have T ⊢ ϕ 0 → D. Hence we have T ⊢ ¬ϕ 0 which is a contradiction to ϕ 0 ∈ P.
Thus there is ϕ 1 ∈ D such that A |= ϕ 1 , that is, ϕ 1 ∈ G(A).
(Claim 2.4.5 without AC in M)
The next corollary follows immediately from this remark:
We do not know if Corollary 2.5 is false without the added assumption that V is M[A] for a set of ordinals A.
More generally, it seems to be open if there is a characterisation of the setgeneric extensions of an arbitrary model of ZF; or at least of such extensions given by partial orders which are well-ordered in the ground model.
Grigorieff's theorem can be also obtained by a modification of the proof of Theorem 2.3.
Corollary 2.6 (S. Grigorieff [10]). Suppose that M is an inner model of a model V of ZFC and V is a set-generic extension of M. Then any inner model N of V (of ZFC) with M ⊆ N is a set-generic extension of M and hence definable in V . Also, for such N, V is a set-generic extension of N.
If V is κ-c.c. set-generic extension of M in addition, then N is a κ-c.c.
set-generic extension of M and V is a κ-c.c. set-generic extension of N.
Similarly to Theorem 2.3, we can also characterize generic extensions obtained via a partial ordering of cardinality ≤ κ.
For M and V as above, we say that V is κ-decomposable into M if for any a ∈ V with a ⊆ M, there are a i ∈ M, i ∈ κ such that a = i<κ a i .
Theorem 2.7. Suppose that V is a transitive model of ZFC and M an inner model of ZFC definable in V and κ is a cardinal in M. Then V is a generic extension of M by a partial ordering in M of size ≤ κ (in M) if and only if
Proof. If V is a generic extension of M by a generic filter G over a partial ordering P ∈ M of size ≤ κ (in M) then P has the κ + -c.c. and hence M κ + -globally covers V by Theorem 2.1. V is κ-decomposable into M since, for any a ∈ V with a =ȧ G , we have a = {{m ∈ M : p -P " m ∈ȧ "} : p ∈ G}.
Suppose now that M κ + -globally covers V and V is κ-decomposable into M.
By Theorem 2.3, there is a κ + -c.c. partial ordering P in M and a P-generic filter
. Without loss of generality, we may assume that P consists of the positive elements of a complete Boolean algebra B (in M). By κ-decomposability, G can be decomposed into κ sets G i ∈ M, i < κ. Without loss of generality, we may assume that 1l P forces this fact. So lettinġ G be the standard name of G andĠ i , i < κ be names of G i , i < κ respectively, we may assume (2.16) -P "Ġ = i<κĠ i ".
Working in M, let X i ⊆ P be a maximal pairwise incompatible set of conditions p which decideĠ i to be G i,p ∈ M for each i < κ. By the κ + -c.c. of P, we have | X i | ≤ κ. Clearly, we have p ≤ P B G i,p for all i < κ and p ∈ X i . Let
Claim 2.7.1. P ′ is dense in P.
⊢ Suppose p ∈ P. Then there is q ≤ p such that q decides someĠ i to be G i,q and p ∈ G i,q . Let r ∈ X i be compatible with q. Then we have r ≤ P B G i,r = B G i,q ≤ p.
In the proof of Lemma 2.4, we used a formal deductive system of L ∞ (µ) without specifying exactly which system we are using. It is enough to consider a system of deduction which contains all logical axioms we used in the course of the proof together with modus ponens and some infinitary deduction rules like:
What we need for such a system is that its correctness and upward absoluteness hold while we do not make use of any version of completeness of the system. Formal deduction systems for infinitary logics have been studied extensively in 1960s and 1970s, see e.g. [14] , [15] , [20] . Nevertheless, to be concrete, we shall introduce below such a deductive system S for L ∞ (µ).
One peculiar task for us here is that we have to make our deduction system S such that S does not rely on AC so that we can apply it in an inner model M which does not necessarily satisfy AC to obtain Corollary 2.5.
Recall that we have introduced L ∞ (µ) as the smallest class containing the sets α, 0 , α ∈ µ as the codes of the prediactes "α ∈Ȧ" for α ∈ µ and closed with respect to ϕ, 1 for ϕ ∈ L ∞ (µ) and Φ, 2 for all sets Φ ⊆ L ∞ (µ) where ϕ, 1 and Φ, 2 represent ¬ϕ and Φ respectively. Here, to be more precise about the role of the infinite conjunction we add the infinitary logical connective , and assume that Φ is coded by Φ, 3 and thus L ∞ (µ) is also closed with respect to Φ, 3 for all sets Φ ⊆ L ∞ (µ).
The axioms of S consist of the following formulas:
for each tautology ϕ (A 0 , A 1 , . .., A n−1 ) of (finitary) propositional logic and ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 ,..., ϕ n−1 ∈ L ∞ (µ); (A2) ϕ → Φ and Φ → ϕ for any set Φ ⊂ L ∞ (µ) and ϕ ∈ Φ;
(A3) ¬( Φ) ↔ {¬ϕ : ϕ ∈ Φ} and ¬( Φ) ↔ {¬ϕ : ϕ ∈ Φ} for any set Φ ⊆ L ∞ (µ); and
for any ϕ ∈ L ∞ (µ) and any set Ψ ⊆ L ∞ (µ).
Deduction Rules:
(Modus Ponens)
is a labeled tree T, f such that (3.1) T = T, ≤ is a tree growing upwards with its root r 0 and T with (≤)
is well-founded;
(3.4) if t ∈ T is a maximal element then either f (t) ∈ Γ or t is one of the axioms of S; (3.5) if t ∈ T and P ⊆ T is the set of all immediate successors of t, then
is one of the deduction rules.
We have to stress here that, in (3.5), we do not assume that the function f is one-to-one since otherwise we have to choose a proof for each formula in the set in the premises of (R1) and (R2). Thus, for example, we can deduce T ⊢ Φ in S from T ⊢ ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Φ without appealing to AC. Now the proof of the following is an easy exercise: An alternative setting to the argument by means of a deductive system is to make use of the following definition of M |= "Γ ⊢ ϕ" in the proof of Lemma 2.4:
Note that this is definable in M using the forcing relation definable on M. It remains to verify that this notion has the desired degree of absoluteness. Actually we can easily prove the full absoluteness, that is, if N is a transitive model containing M with the same ordinals as those of M then, for Γ,
First suppose that B ⊆ µ is a set of ordinals in a set-generic extension N[G] of N such that B witnesses the failure of Γ ⊢ ϕ in N. Let x be a real which is generic over N for the Lévy collapse of a sufficiently large ν to ω such that Γ and µ become countable in the generic extension N[x]. Then x is also Lévy generic over M and M[x] is a submodel of N[x] . By Lévy Absoluteness, it follows that that there exists B ′ ⊆ µ in M[x] which also witnesses the failure of Γ ⊢ ϕ in M.
Conversely, suppose that Γ ⊢ ϕ holds in N and let B ⊆ µ be a set of ordinals in a set-generic extension M[G] of M such that B witnesses the failure of Γ ⊢ ϕ in M. Then B also belongs to an extension of M which is generic for the Lévy collapse of sufficently large ν to ω; choose a condition p in this forcing which forces the existence of such a B. Now if x is Lévy-generic over N and contains the condition p, we see that there is a counterexample to Γ ⊢ ϕ in N witnessed in N[x], contrary to our assumption.
With both of the interpretations of ⊢ we can check that the arguments in Section 2 go through.
An axiomatic framework for the set-generic multiverse
In this section, we consider some possible axiomatic treatments of the set-generic multiverse. Such axiomatic treatments are also discussed e.g. in [9] , [19] , [22] . We introduce a conservative extension MZFC of ZFC in which we can treat the multiverse of set-generic extensions of models of ZFC as a collection of countable transitive models. This system or some further extension of it (which can possibly also treat tame class forcings) may be used as a basis for direct formulation of statements concerning the multiverse.
The language L MZF of the axiom system MZFC consists of the ǫ-relation symbol '∈', and a constant symbol 'v' which should represent the countable transitive "ground model".
The axiom system MZFC consists of By (4.1), MZFC proves the (unique) existence of the closure M of "{v}" under forcing extension and definable "inner model" of "ZF" (here 'ZF' is set in quotation marks since we can only argue in metamathematics that such "inner model" satisfies each instance of replacement). Note that M ⊆ H ℵ 1 . Here "inner model" is actually phrased in L ZF as "transitive almost universal subset closed under Gödel operations". If we had v |= ZFC, we would have w |= ZF for any inner model w of v in this sense by Theorem 13.9 in [13] . In MZFC, however, we have only v |= ϕ for each axiom ϕ of ZFC (in the metamathematics). Nevertheless, for all such "inner model" w and hence for all w ∈ M, we have w |= ϕ for all axiom ϕ of ZF by the proof of Theorem 13.9 in [13] and the Forcing Theorem. Apparently, this is enough to consider M in this framework as the set-generic multiverse.
Similarly, we can also start from any extension of ZFC (e.g. with some additional large cardinal axiom) and make M closed under some more operations such as some well distinguished class of class forcing extensions.
The following theorem shows that we do not increase the consistency strength by moving from ZFC to MZFC. Proof. "⇒" is trivial.
For "⇐", suppose that MZFC ⊢ ψ for a formula ψ in L ZF . Let P be a proof of ψ from MZFC and let T be the finite fragment of ZFC consisting of all axioms ϕ of ZFC such that v |= ϕ appears in P. Let Φ(x) be the formula in L ZF saying "x is a countable transitive set and x |= T ".
By the Deduction Theorem, we can recast P to a proof of ZFC ⊢ ∀x(Φ(x) → ψ). On the other hand we have ZFC ⊢ ∃xΦ(x) (by the Reflection Principle, Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem and Mostowski's Collapsing Theorem).
Hence we obtain a proof of ψ from ZFC alone.
(Theorem 4.1)
It may be a little bit disappointing if each set-theoretic universe in the multiverse seen from the "meta-universe" is merely a countable set. Of course if M is an inner model of a model W of ZFC (i.e. M is a model which is a transitive class ⊆ W and M, W |= ZFC) there are always partial ordering P in M for which there is no (M, P)-generic set in W (e.g. any partial ordering collapsing a cardinal of W cannot have its generic set in W ).
However, if we are content with a meta-universe which is not a model of full ZFC, we can work with the following setting where each of the "elements" of the set-generic multiverse is an inner model of a meta-universe: starting from a model V of ZFC with an inaccessible cardinal κ, we generically extend it to
. W |= ZFC− the Power Set Axiom and for any partial ordering P in M there is a (M, P)-generic set in W . Thus an NBG-type theory of W with a new unary predicate corresponding to M can be used as a framework of the theory for the set-generic multiverse (which is obtained by considering all the set-generic grounds of M, and then all the set generic extensions of them, etc.) as a "class" of classes in W . A setting similar to this idea was also discussed in [19] .
Independent buttons
The multiverse view sometimes highlights problems which would be never asked in the conventional context of forcing constructions. The existence of infinitely many independent buttons which arose in connection with the characterization of the modal logic of the set-generic multiverse (see [12] ) is one such question. A sentence ϕ in L ZF is said to be a button (for set-genericity) if any setgeneric extension V [G] of the ground model V has a further set-generic extension
Formulas ϕ n , n ∈ ω are independent buttons, if ϕ n , n ∈ ω are unpushed buttons and for any set-generic extension V [G] of the ground model V and any
In [12] , it is claimed that formulas b n , n ∈ ω form an infinite set of independent buttons over V = L where b n is a formula asserting: "ω n L is not a cardinal". This is used to prove that the principles of forcing expressible in the modal logic of the set-theoretic multiverse as a Kripke frame where modal operator is interpreted as:
coincides with the modal theory S4.2 (Main Theorem 6 in [12] ). Unfortunately, it seems that there is no guarantee that (5.1) holds in an arbitrary set-generic extension V [G] for these b n , n ∈ ω.
In the following, we introduce an alternative set of infinitely many formulas which are actually independent buttons for any ground model of ZFC+ "GCH below ℵ ω " + "ℵ n = ℵ L n for all n ∈ ω" which can be used as b n , n ∈ ω in [12] . We first note that, for Main Theorem 6 in [12] we actually need only the existence of an arbitrary finite number of independent buttons. In the case of V = L the following formulas can be used for this: Let ψ n be the statement that ℵ L n is a cardinal and the L-least
M is a set-generic (or arbitrary) extension of L in which the button ¬ψ n has not been pushed, then by forcing with T L n over M we push this button and do not affect any of the other unpushed buttons ¬ψ m , m = n, as this forcing is ℵ n -distributive and has size ℵ n . Rittberg [18] also found independent buttons under V = L.
Now we turn to a construction of infinitely many independent buttons for which we even do not need the existence of Suslin trees. For n ∈ ω, let ϕ n be the statement: (5.3) there is an injection from ℵ n+2 L to P(ℵ n L ).
Note that ϕ n is pushed in a set-generic extension V [G] if and only if it holds in V [G]. Thus ϕ n for each n ∈ ω is a button provided that ϕ n does not hold in the ground model. We show that these ϕ n , n ∈ ω are independent buttons (over any ground model where they are unpushed -e.g., when V = L).
Suppose that we are working in some model W of ZFC. In W , let A = {n ∈ ω : ϕ n holds} and B ⊆ ω be arbitrary with A ⊆ B. It is enough to prove the following Proposition 5.1. We can force (over W ) that ϕ n holds for all n ∈ B and ¬ϕ n for all n ∈ ω \ B.
Proof. In W , let κ n = | ℵ n L | for n ∈ ω. We use the notation of [16] on the partial orderings with partial functions and denote with Fn(κ, λ, µ) the set of all partial functions from κ to λ with cardinality < µ ordered by reverse inclusion. By ∆-System Lemma, it is easy to see that Fn(κ, λ, µ) has the (λ <µ ) + -c.c. Let (5.4) P n = Fn(κ n+2 , 2, κ n ) if n ∈ B \ A 1l otherwise.
Let P = n∈ω P n be the full support product of P n , n ∈ ω. Then we clearly have -P " ϕ n " for all n ∈ B. Thus to show that P creates a generic extension as desired, it is enough to show that -P " ¬ϕ n " for all n ∈ ω \ B. Suppose that (5.5) n ∈ ω \ B.
Then we have (5.6) P n = 1l.
Since ϕ n does not hold in W , we have κ n < κ n+1 < κ n+2 and 2 κn = κ n+1 in W . By (5.6), P factors as P ∼ P(< n) × P(> n) where P(< n) = k<n P k and P(> n) = k>n P k . We show that both P(> n) and P(< n) over P(> n) do not add any injection from κ n+2 into P(κ n ). P(> n) is κ n+1 -closed. Thus it does not add any new subsets of κ n . So if it added an injection from κ n+2 into P(κ n ) then it would collapse the cardinal κ n+2 . Since P(> n) further factors as P(> n) ∼ P n+1 × k>n+1 P k and k>n+1 P k is κ n+2 -closed the only way P(> n) could collapse κ n+2 would be if P n+1 did so. But then, since P n+1 has the (2 <κ n+1 ) + -c.c. with (2 <κ n+1 ) + = (2 κn ) + , we would have 2 κn ≥ κ n+2 . This is a contradiction to the choice (5.5) of n. So P(> n)
forces ϕ n to fail. In the rest of the proof, we work in W P(>n) and show that P(< n) does not add any injection from κ n+2 into P(κ n ). Note that, by κ n+1 -closedness of P(> n), we have Fn(κ m+2 , 2, κ m ) W = Fn(κ m+2 , 2, κ m ) W P(>n) for m < n.
We have the following two cases:
Case I. n − 1 ∈ A ∪ (ω \ B). Then P(< n) ∼ P(< m) for some m < n and P(< m) has the (2 κ m−1 ) + -c.c. with (2 κ m−1 ) + ≤ κ n .
Case II. n − 1 ∈ B \ A. Then 2 <κ n−1 = κ n and P(< n) has the κ n+1 -c.c.
In both cases the partial ordering P(< n) has κ n+1 -c.c. and hence the cardinals κ n+1 and κ n+2 are preserved. Since P(< n) has at most cardinality 2 κ n−1 · κ n+1 = κ n+1 , it adds at most κ n+1 κn = κ n+1 new subsets of κ n and thus the size of P(κ n ) remains unchanged. This shows that -P " ¬ϕ n ". (Proposition 5.1)
